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Abstract: Traditionally it has been thought that the moral valence of a proposi-
tion is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to whether someone knows that the proposi-
tion is true, and thus irrelevant to the truth-value of a knowledge ascription. On 
this view, it’s no easier to know, for example, that a bad thing will happen than 
that a good thing will happen (other things being equal). But a series of very sur-
prising recent experiments suggest that this is actually not how we view know-
ledge. On the contrary, people are much more willing to ascribe knowledge of a  
bad outcome. This is known as the epistemic side-effect effect (ESEE) and is a 
specific instance of a widely documented phenomenon, the side-effect effect 
(a.k.a. “the Knobe effect”), which is the most famous finding in experimental 
philosophy. In this paper, I report a new series of five experiments on ESEE and 
in the process accomplish three things. First, I confirm earlier findings on the ef-
fect. Second, I show that the effect is virtually unlimited. Third, I introduce a new 
technique for detecting the effect, which potentially enhances its theoretical sig-
nificance. In particular, my findings make it more likely, though they do not en-
tail, that the effect genuinely reflects the way we think about and ascribe know-
ledge, rather than being the result of a performance error.
1. Introduction
Most theorists think that whether a belief counts as knowledge is unaffected by 
the desirability of the belief or its content. If we’re wondering whether you know 
that a certain event will occur, we’ll attend to whether you believe that the event 
will occur, whether it’s true that the event will occur, whether you have any evid-
* This is the penultimate version of a paper forthcoming in Ergo. Please cite the final, pub-
lished version if possible. 
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ence that it will occur, and perhaps also whether your evidence only “luckily” led 
you to believe the truth. It doesn’t matter whether the event in question is good or 
bad. That is, other things being equal, the event’s valence doesn’t affect whether 
you know that it will occur. Or so mainstream theorizing about knowledge would 
have have us believe (e.g. Steup 1996, Lehrer 2000, Feldman 2003, Fumerton 
2006, BonJour 2009).
But important recent experimental work suggests that mainstream opinion is 
simply wrong about this (Beebe and Buckwalter 2010, Beebe and Jensen 2012, 
Beebe and Shea forthcoming). The valence of an outcome apparently does influ-
ence whether we ascribe knowledge. For example, people are more willing to 
ascribe knowledge to a CEO if he thinks that his company’s policies will harm 
rather than help the environment. This is known as the epistemic side-effect ef-
fect (ESEE; pronounced ‘easy’). It is a specific instance of a widely documented 
phenomenon, the side-effect effect (a.k.a. “the Knobe effect”), which is the most 
famous finding in experimental philosophy. ESEE is an important and surprising 
discovery about how we think of knowledge, which should be of interest to philo-
sophers and cognitive scientists more generally. It is my focus here.
Contemporary epistemologists have taken it for granted that patterns in or-
dinary usage should, or at least can, constrain substantive epistemological theor-
izing. It is widely assumed that theorists should respect patterns of competent 
and literal knowledge attribution. Other things being equal, we prefer an epi-
stemological theory to the extent that it counts ordinary knowledge attributions 
as competent and literal (more on this in section 2.2). In this paper, I investigate 
whether we should think that ESEE reflects such a pattern and, in turn, whether 
it ought to inform epistemological theory. Although further work ultimately re-
mains to be done, I report some good initial evidence that ESEE does reflect a 
pattern worthy of theoretical respect.
Here is the paper’s plan. Section 2 situates the present discussion within a 
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broader research program; it reviews previous work on side-effect effects and 
outlines competing approaches to explaining them. Section 3 poses two questions 
that set the stage for further experimental inquiry into ESEE. Section 4 reports 
four experiments which collectively suggest that, when observed using previous 
methods, ESEE is too broad and easily activated for it to reveal how we think 
about knowledge. Section 5 suggests an alternative approach for detecting ESEE. 
Section 6 enacts this alternative and reports an experiment that provides the best 
evidence thus far that ESEE reflects a competent pattern of knowledge ascription. 
Sections 7 sets an agenda for further research into this topic.
2. Knowledge can be ESEE
There has been a spate of valuable recent work on ordinary knowledge ascrip-
tions (e.g. Weinberg et al. 2001, Swain and Weinberg 2008, Nagel 2008, May et 
al. 2010, Feltz and Zarpentine 2010, Starmans and Friedman 2012, Schaffer and 
Knobe 2012, Sripada and Stanley forthcoming, Pinillos forthcoming). These stud-
ies suggest that some surprising factors affect whether laypeople attribute know-
ledge (for an overview, see Buckwalter 2012). Here I will focus on one set of stud-
ies in particular. These studies take inspiration from Joshua Knobe’s pioneering 
work on how people’s evaluative judgments affect whether they describe out-
comes as intentional (Knobe 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2010). This section briefly re-
views relevant prior work.
2.1. SEE, this is easy
Suppose that an agent embarks on a course of action aimed at a primary outcome 
(a central effect). And suppose that the agent also anticipates but does not desire 
that her conduct will have a certain side effect. Knobe found that if the side effect 
is bad or undesirable, then people are much more likely to describe the agent as  
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having intentionally brought it about. For example, to use Knobe’s now famous 
case, suppose that a CEO decides to start a new program with the primary aim 
being to increase profits. And suppose that the CEO also anticipates but does not 
desire that the program will, as a side effect, affect the environment. Did the CEO 
intentionally bring about the environmental side effect? People are much more 
likely to say that he did if the side effect is harmful rather than helpful. This is 
known as the side-effect effect (SEE).
A side effect’s valence influences ascriptions of intentionality, and it has also 
been shown to affect ascriptions of other practical attitudes, such as deciding, be-
ing in favor of, and desiring, among others (Pettit and Knobe 2009, Tannen-
baum et al. 2009), as well as act individuation (Ulatowski 2009). This is true 
whether the side effect is negatively valenced because it violates a norm of mor-
ality, prudence, aesthetics, or etiquette. The effect appears to be present regard-
less of gender, age or native language. The effect is very robust.
An important question is what explains SEE. Knobe groups the competing 
accounts into competence explanations and distortion explanations, and this 
taxonomy has taken hold in the literature (e.g. Buckwalter 2013). Competence ex-
planations attribute the effect to the fact that ‘moral considerations actually fig-
ure in the competencies people use to’ attribute psychological states (Knobe 
2010: 320). Knobe favors this sort of account, though he does not claim that it 
has any immediate implications for a substantive theory of what psychological 
states are, or for a semantic theory of psychological predicates (e.g. Knobe and 
Burra 2006: 332–3, 338). Instead, Knobe claims only that the effect reveals 
something deep and important about the way we ordinarily think about psycholo-
gical states, about our underlying competence in applying such concepts.
Distortion explanations deny that moral considerations figure into the under-
lying competence, and instead attribute the effect to other factors that distort the 
competence’s operation. They claim that the effect is instead due to performance 
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error (Nadelhoffer 2006, Malle 2006: 103–4, Alicke and Rose 2010), or to prag-
matic concerns that don’t reveal anything about how people think about psycho-
logical states per se (Adams and Steadman 2004), or to features of the materials 
used in the experiments (Guglielmo and Malle 2010).
Knobe gently sets aside whether there is a semantic or metaphysical upshot 
of his conceptual competence model. But due to certain preoccupations and 
methodological commitments in contemporary epistemology, when we turn to 
whether the side-effect effect shows up for knowledge ascriptions too, it’s not so 
simple to maintain the division between people’s underlying competence in clas-
sifying things in a certain category, on the one hand, and the nature of things that 
populate that category, on the other.1
Epistemologists have taken it for granted that patterns in ordinary usage 
should, or at least can, constrain substantive theorizing about the nature of 
knowledge, or the (abstract) concept of knowledge, or the meaning of ‘knows’ 
(Austin 1956, Cohen 1999, Rysiew 2001, DeRose 2009, Hawthorne 2004, Stanley 
2005, Fantl and McGrath 2009). Of course, not just any pattern is ripe for guid-
ing theory. But it is widely assumed that theorists should respect patterns of com-
petent and literal knowledge ascription. There will always be some interplay 
between one’s theory and what one is willing to consider a pattern of competent  
and literal knowledge ascription (e.g. Davis 2007, Bach 2008, Turri forthcoming 
b). But it’s not “anything goes.” And a theory which implies that much of our or-
dinary practice of knowledge ascription is either incompetent or non-literal has, 
as they say, “some explaining to do.”
Setting aside contemporary epistemologists’ methodological predilections, 
there is another reason to take competent and literal application of concepts seri-
ously. Over the past forty years, philosophers of language and mind have de-
1 Buckwalter (2013) does an especially good job of explaining and properly emphasizing the 
significance of these methodological points.
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veloped externalist theories of semantic meaning and mental content (Kripke 
1972, Putnam 1975, Burge 1979, Burge 1986). Though not uncontroversial, these 
externalist theories are widely accepted. If, as Donald Davidson (1983: 146) puts 
it, ‘Belief is in its nature veridical,’ or as George Santayana (1923: 9) wrote, ‘Intel-
ligence is by its nature veridical,’ or as the 11th century Indian philosopher Sri-
harsa thought, ‘Cognition is ordinarily by nature true or veridical’ (Phillips 2011), 
then we should expect competent and literal applications of concepts to be largely 
accurate. So despite Knobe’s attempt to downplay it, a conceptual-competence 
account might have a fairly direct semantic or metaphysical upshot after all.
In what follows, my focus will be knowledge, knowledge ascriptions and the 
concept of knowledge. I don’t claim that any point I make generalizes to other 
psychological states, ascriptions, concepts, or side-effect effects concerning them.
2.2. See, this is ESEE
James Beebe and Wesley Buckwalter (2010) showed that the side-effect effect ex-
tends to knowledge ascriptions too. They took Knobe’s original case and instead 
of asking participants whether the CEO intentionally brought about the environ-
mental side effect, they asked whether the CEO knew that the program would 
bring about the side effect. Beebe and Buckwalter observed a striking asymmetry: 
participants were significantly more likely to ascribe knowledge if the environ-
ment is harmed rather than helped.2 In other words, they discovered ESEE. Their 
result has been replicated and appears to be robust (Beebe and Jensen 2012; see 
also section 4.1 below).
Beebe and Buckwalter conjecture that ESEE might reveal something import-
ant about the nature of knowledge and its relation to moral value: whether a be-
lief counts as knowledge can depend on the moral status of actions based on it.  
2 Right around the same time, some armchair epistemologist got lucky and predicted the 
same thing (see Turri 2012a).
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But they are careful to note that there is no easy path from the observed patterns  
of knowledge attribution among laypeople to sound theoretical conclusions about 
the nature of knowledge. Beebe and Jensen (2012) are likewise cautious about in-
ferring anything about the nature of knowledge itself from the ESEE data. But 
Beebe, Buckwalter and Jensen all seem to agree that the ESEE data lend support  
to a view about the nature of knowledge which has lately been gathering support, 
namely, that factors other than truth, belief, evidence and reliability can directly 
affect whether you know (e.g. Fantl and McGrath 2002, 2009, Hawthorne 2004, 
Stanley 2005). On this approach, practical, moral and other traditionally 
nonepistemic evaluative factors can directly affect whether you know. This is an 
intriguing thesis which, if true, reveals something deep and important about 
knowledge.
2.3. Gee, this is ESEE
Buckwalter (2013) and Beebe and Shea (forthcoming) have recently extended this 
line of reasoning to “Gettier cases.” Very roughly, a Gettier case is a case where a 
subject has a justified true belief which, according to conventional wisdom in 
philosophy, fails to count as knowledge due to an improbable confluence of luck 
(Gettier 1963, Starmans and Friedman 2012, Turri 2011, Turri 2012a, Turri forth-
coming b). In particular, Gettier cases involve two strokes of luck: a stroke of bad 
luck, which would ordinarily prevent the subject’s belief from being true, followed 
by a stroke of good luck, which “cancels out” the bad luck by making the subject’s 
belief true anyway (Zagzebski’s 1994: 66; Zagzebksi 1996: 288–9; compare Sosa 
1991: 238).
Beebe and Shea asked participants about a CEO very similar to the one in 
Knobe’s original story, except that this CEO has been “Gettiered.” Participants 
were asked to agree or disagree with the claim that the CEO knew that the envir-
onment would be helped or harmed. Participants rated their agreement or dis-
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agreement on a 7-point Likert scale. They were significantly more likely to agree 
with the statement if the side effect was harmful rather than helpful. The mean 
response (4.35) fell above the mid-point and responses of 5 and 7 were both 
modes, indicating that participants tended to think that the Gettiered CEO knew. 
Beebe and Jensen observed similar results with different cover stories. Buckwal-
ter has observed even more striking results with some of his vignettes, with mean 
responses topping 6 on a 7-point scale. This is Gettier made ESEE, or the Gettier 
epistemic side-effect effect (GESEE). I replicated these results (see section 4.2 
below).
A natural reaction to these cases is that participant response is being distor-
ted by a desire to blame the protagonist and to hold him accountable for a rotten 
outcome that he could have prevented (compare Alicke 2008, Nadelhoffer 2006). 
Agreeing that the CEO ‘knew’ is a way of agreeing that he should be held respons-
ible for the environmental harm. By contrast, people aren’t interested in giving 
the CEO credit for environmental improvement that he didn’t even care about. 
But Buckwalter (2013) has observed the effect persist even when participants are 
asked whether some third-party, who can’t plausibly be held responsible, knows 
that the environmental side effect will occur. So a straightforward blame-based 
distortion account doesn’t explain all the data.
If we’re attracted to the idea that our ordinary practice of ascribing know-
ledge should at least broadly constrain theorizing about knowledge itself, then 
these data seriously threaten some well entrenched positions in contemporary 
epistemology. Perhaps whether you know does partly depend on whether you’re 
up to no good. Perhaps we should leave room in our epistemology for Gettiered 
knowledge.
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3. How easy can it get?
Maybe ESEE can be extended to unsettle other articles of conventional wisdom 
too. Conventional wisdom has it that knowledge requires truth, and that know-
ledge requires belief. Are these requirements reflected in ordinary usage?
3.1. It’s not easy being . . . CHESEE?
Consider this contrarian hypothesis:
Contrarian Hypothesis (CH): Knowledge is not factive.
Otherwise put, CH says that knowledge does not require truth: it’s possible to 
know false things. Some philosophers have argued that, on the ordinary concep-
tion of knowledge, CH is true (Hazlett 2010, 2012). But virtually all philosophers 
think that CH is obviously false. And Buckwalter (ms.) has reported several stud-
ies which suggest that, on the ordinary conception of knowledge, CH is false. But  
Buckwalter cautiously reminds us that there might be other evidence that know-
ledge, ordinarily understood, is not factive. We saw SEE extended to ESEE, which 
was in turn extended to GESEE. Perhaps the same phenomenon might also 
provide evidence for CH. In other words, we’ve seen that knowledge ascriptions 
can be made ESEE, so can they also be made CHESEE (pronounced ‘cheesy’)?
3.2.  Is knowledge a breeze?
Consider also this unorthodox view:
Belief not Required (BR): Knowledge does not require belief.
Some philosophers have advocated BR (e.g. Radford 1966, Lewis 1996), and ex-
perimental philosophers have recently taken up its cause (Schwitzgebel and My-
ers-Schulz forthcoming; Murray, Sytsma and Livengood 2012; Buckwalter, Rose 
and Turri, 2013). But most philosophers think that BR is obviously false; they 
think it’s obvious that knowledge entails belief (Rose and Schaffer 2013). But per-
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haps that’s not the ordinary view. Perhaps the ESEE pattern will extend to BR 
too. We’ve seen that knowledge ascriptions can be made ESEE. Can they also be 
made BRESEE (pronounced ‘breezy’)?
4. Actually, this is too easy
Suppose that in the same way that knowledge ascriptions can be made ESEE and 
GESEE, they can also be made CHESEE or BRESEE or both. What would that 
show?
I think that it would make a conceptual-competence explanation of the ob-
served effect much less likely. It would seem more likely that participants are in-
competently applying their concept of knowledge, or competently but falsely ap-
plying it for pragmatic reasons, or competently applying some other concept in 
response to a ‘knowledge’ question. Over thousands of years and across many dif-
ferent cultures, careful reflection has led people repeatedly and to the view that 
knowledge requires truth and belief (or something very similar). This is over-
whelmingly reflected in the most influential historical and contemporary theories 
of knowledge (Matilal 1986, Steup 1996, Lehrer 2000, Feldman 2003, Fumerton 
2006, BonJour 2009, Phillips 2011). And if a conceptual-competence explanation 
is unlikely, then we need to be much more cautious when determining whether 
the ESEE data support various substantive proposals about the nature of know-
ledge itself. Of course, none of that would go to show that the effect is unreal. On 
the contrary, the point is that the effect is, ironically, too real for it to guide a the-
ory of knowledge.
By contrast, if knowledge ascriptions can’t be made CHESEE or BRESEE in 
that same way, it eliminates two barriers to a conceptual-competence account. Of 
course, it would not entail that a conceptual-competence account is true. But it  
would eliminate potential worries about the effect not ruled out by previous stud-
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ies.
4.1. Experiment 1
This section reports an experiment designed to test whether knowledge ascrip-
tions can be made CHESEE. That is, the experiment tests whether the method 
used to detect ESEE and GESEE in earlier experiments will also produce results 
that support the unorthodox view that knowledge doesn’t require truth.
4.1.1. Method
Participants (N = 147)3 were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2 
(Valence of side-effect: Help/Harm) x 3 (Luck: Normal/False/Gettier) between-
subjects experiment: Normal Harm, False Harm, Gettier Harm, Normal Help, 
False Help, Gettier Help. (See Table 1.) Each participant read one of six stories.
The stories for the conditions were variants of the CEO case, built up from 
narrative modules. These were the narrative modules (help/harm variations un-
derlined and separated by a slash):
(No Luck) The vice president of a manufacturing company went to the 
CEO and said, "We are thinking of starting a new program. It will increase 
our profits, and/but it will also improve/harm local water quality, because 
it requires that we start/stop dumping polluted water into the river behind 
our manufacturing plant." The CEO answered, "I don't care at all about 
improving/harming local water quality. I just want to make as much profit 
3 Sixty-seven female, aged 18–65, M = 28.8, SD = 9.92. As with the experiments reported 
below, participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk and compensated $0.25 
for approximately 2–3 minutes of their time. Participants were not allowed to re-take any 
survey reported here, and participants who had taken previous similar surveys were ex-
cluded by their AMT Worker ID. Participants were located throughout the United States. 
Ninety-eight percent reported English as their native language. They filled out a brief 
demographic survey after testing. I excluded data from fifty-five participants who failed 
comprehension questions. Including data from these participants made a small but statist-
ically insignificant difference to the results reported below. Previous studies of ESEE ef-
fects don’t report asking comprehension questions.
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as I can." Then the CEO made his decision: "Let's start the new program 
and make some serious profits." The company then started the new pro-
gram, and sure enough, over the next few months, it caused their profits to 
increase dramatically.
(Bad Luck) But as it turns out, the vice president was wrong about some-
thing: the company's new program did not require them to start/stop 
dumping polluted water into the river. So they never did start/stop.
(Good Luck – Harm) However, at the same time that the company was 
starting its new program, a local military installation decided to save 
money on expensive waste disposal. Instead of going through the proper 
procedures, they decided to secretly dump all of their toxic waste straight 
into a local lake, which harmed local water quality. This illegal and harm-
ful dumping remained a secret and was never made public. When the CEO 
made his decision to start the new program, he was unaware that the milit-
ary was going to dump the toxic waste.
(Good Luck – Help) However, at the same time that the company was 
starting its new program, the mayor decided to take action and improve 
local water quality. Instead of going through the proper procedure, the 
mayor secretly ordered the local water department to upgrade the filtra-
tion system at the local water treatment plant, which improved local water 
quality. This illegal but helpful expenditure remained a secret and was 
never made public. When the CEO made his decision to start the new 
program, he was unaware that the mayor was going to order the upgrade.
Table 1 shows how stories for the different conditions were built, along with 
the questions used. The “Good Luck” and “Bad Luck” modules combine to form 
Gettier cases by virtue of the “double luck” recipe described earlier (section 2.3). 
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These were the comprehension questions  (options in brackets):4
(CQ1) Did the company's program cause their profits to increase? 
[Yes/No]
(CQ2) Did the company's program improve/harm local water quality? 
[Yes/No]
(CQ3) When the CEO makes his decision to start the program, he thinks 
that local water quality will be improved/ harmed because he thinks that 
_______. [the CEO’s company will start/stop dumping pollution into the 
river/the military will start dumping toxic waste into the lake/the local wa-
ter treatment plant will be upgraded]
(CQ4) What causes local water quality to be improved/ harmed? [The 
CEO's company started/stopped dumping pollution into the river./The 
military started dumping toxic waste into the lake./The local water treat-
ment plant was upgraded.]5
The test question was:
(KLikert) Please tell us the extent to which you agree or disagree with the 
following statement: At the point in the story when the CEO makes his de-
cision to start the program, he knows that local water quality will be 
harmed.
Responses were collected on a five-point scale: strongly disagree (= 1), dis-
agree, neutral, agree, strongly agree (= 5). Questions were all presented on a 
single screen and the story remained at the top of the screen throughout. Ques-
4 Options were rotated randomly for all questions in all experiments reported here, except  
for Likert scales and confidence measures, which were always ordered low-to-high. Like-
wise, questions were always presented in the same order in all experiments.
5 CQ4 was not asked in the False Harm and False Help conditions because it confusingly 
presupposes that local water quality was improved/harmed. The stories for these condi-
tions give no indication that anything does improve/harm local water quality.
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tions were always presented in the same order. Response options for the ques-
tions were rotated randomly, except for the options on Likert scales, which were 
always presented in the same order.6
Table 1: Experiment 1: List of modules composing the storylines, along with the questions, in the  
diferent conditions.
Normal Harm False Harm Getier Harm
No Luck
CQ1–4
KLikert
No Luck
Bad Luck
CQ1–3
KLikert
No Luck
Bad Luck
Good Luck — Harm
CQ1–4
KLikert
Normal Help False Help Getier Help
No Luck
CQ1–4
KLikert
No Luck
Bad Luck
CQ1–3
KLikert
No Luck
Bad Luck
Good Luck — Help
CQ1–4
KLikert
Setting up the experiment this way allowed me to accomplish three things at 
once. First, comparing the Normal conditions will test whether we can replicate 
earlier experiments in which participants were more likely to count a true belief 
as knowledge in the Harm condition than in the Help condition; that is, it tests 
ESEE. Second, comparing the Gettier conditions will test whether we can replic-
ate earlier experiments in which participants were more likely to count a Get-
tiered belief as knowledge in the Harm condition than in the Help condition; that 
is, it tests GESEE. Third, comparing the False conditions will test whether parti-
cipants are more likely to count a false belief as knowledge in the Harm condition 
than in the Help condition; that is, it tests CHESEE.
4.1.2. Results and discussion
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a main effect of Valence7 and 
6 The same is true in all experiments reported here.
7 F(1, 141) = 34.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .198, all tests two-tailed unless otherwise noted.
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an interaction effect between Valence and Luck.8 There was no main effect of 
Luck.9
The results from the Normal conditions replicated earlier findings on ESEE. 
Knowledge scores in Normal Harm were higher than in Normal Help. 10 The mean 
knowledge score in both conditions was significantly above the midpoint.11 The 
mode in Normal Harm was 5, compared to a mode of 4 in Normal Help.
The results from the Gettier conditions replicated earlier findings on GESEE. 
Knowledge scores in Gettier Harm were trending higher than in Gettier Help. 12 
The mean knowledge score in both conditions was significantly above the mid-
point.13 The mode in Gettier Harm was 5, compared to a mode of 4 in Gettier 
Help.
The results from the False conditions provide equally good evidence for CHE-
SEE. Knowledge scores in False Harm were higher than in False Help.14 The 
mean knowledge score in the Harm condition was significantly above the mid-
point15 and virtually identical to Normal Harm. The mode in False Harm was 5, 
compared to a mode of 4 in False Help.
Figure 1 visualizes the results from this experiment.
8 F(2, 141) = 5.2, p = .013, ηp2 = .059.
9 F(2, 141) = 1.48, p = .231, n.s.
10  Normal Harm, M = 4.79, SD = 0.77; Normal Help, M = 3.77, SD = 1.24; t(40) = 3.28, MD 
= 1.02, p = .002.
11 Normal Harm, t(28) = 12.5, p < 0.001; Normal Help, t(12) = 2.245, p = 0.044; test value = 
3.
12 Gettier Harm, M = 4.24, SD = 1.23; Gettier Help, M = 3.74, SD = 1.15; t(54) = 1.56, MD = 
0.5, p = .0625, one-tailed.
13 Gettier Harm, t(24) = 5.02, p < .001; Gettier Help, t(30) = 3.6, p = .001; test value = 3.
14 False Harm, M = 4.76, SD = 0.83; False Help, M = 3.0, SD = 1.25; t(39.76) = 5.824, MD = 
1.76, p < .001.
15 t(24) = 10.6, p < 0.001; test value = 3.
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Figure 1: Experiment 1: Mean agreement with the knowledge ascription, on a 1 (strongly disagree)  
to 5 (strongly agree) scale.
4.2. Experiment 2
This section reports an experiment designed to test whether knowledge ascrip-
tions can be made BRESEE. That is, the experiment tests whether the method 
used to detect ESEE, GESEE and CHESEE in earlier experiments will also pro-
duce results that support the unorthodox view that knowledge doesn’t require be-
lief.
4.2.1. Method
Participants (N = 56)16 were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Harm 
and Help. Participants read a minor variant of a CEO case, in which the CEO 
starts out by saying, ‘I agree that this plan will make us lots of profit. But I reject 
your claim that it will improve/harm local water quality.’ Here is the full vignette 
(help/harm variations underlined and separated by a slash):
16 Twenty female, aged 18–62, M = 28.5, SD = 10.75. I eliminated data from 14 participants 
who failed comprehension questions. Ninety-nine percent reported English as a native lan-
guage.
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The vice president of a manufacturing company went to the CEO and said, 
"We are thinking of starting a new program. It will increase our 
profits, and/but it will also improve/harm local water quality, because it re-
quires that we start/stop dumping polluted water into the river behind our 
manufacturing plant." The CEO answered, "I agree that this plan will make 
us lots of profit. But I reject your claim that it will improve/harm local water 
quality. Anyway, I don't care at all about improving/ harming local water 
quality. I just want to make as much profit as I can." Then the CEO made 
his decision: "Let's start the new program and make some serious profits."  
¶17 The company then started the new program, and sure enough, over the 
next few months, they made lots of profits. But the vice-president was 
right: local water quality was also improved/harmed.
The comprehension questions were:
(CQ1) Did the company’s program cause water quality to be harmed/im-
proved? [Yes/No]
(CQ2) When the CEO makes his decision to start the new program, he 
_______ the vice president’s claim that it will improve/harm local water 
quality. [rejects/accepts]
The test question was the same as in Experiment 1.
4.2.2. Results and discussion
The CEO in each version of the case rejects the claim that the program will harm 
local water quality. If the earlier pattern of ESEE results holds, then there will be 
an effect of condition, with Knowledge scores higher in the Harm condition.
This is exactly what was observed. Knowledge scores were higher in the 
Harm condition than in the Help condition.18 The mean knowledge score was sig-
17 Indicates paragraph break as it appeared on the participant’s screen.
18 Harm, M = 3.6, SD = 1.36; Help, M = 2, SD = 1.05; t(50.38) = 4.64, MD = 1.6, p < .001.
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nificantly above the midpoint in Harm19 and significantly below the midpoint in 
Help.20 The modes in Harm were 4 and 5, compared to a mode of 2 in Help.
It might be thought that participants in Harm were attributing to the CEO 
belief in the relevant claim. But this seems unlikely because there was a compre-
hension question (CQ2) to eliminate such participants. Only participants who 
answered that the CEO rejects the claim were included in the analysis. Moreover, 
there was no effect of condition on whether participants failed CQ2.21 Figure 2 
(section 4.4.2 below) visualizes the results from this experiment.
4.3. Experiment 3
We’ve seen that participants agree that the CEO knows when the proposition in 
question is false, and when the CEO doesn’t believe the proposition. But suppose 
that the proposition is both false and not believed. Will participants then disagree 
with the knowledge ascription? This section reports an experiment that answers 
that question. (Unfortunately, I was unable to invent a memorable acronym for 
this effect.)
4.3.1. Method
Participants (N = 57)22 were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: Harm 
and Help. Participants in this experiment received the exact same treatment as 
their counterparts in Experiment 2, except that the final sentence of the story 
was, “But the vice-president was wrong about something: local water quality was 
not improved/harmed.”
19 t(34) = 2.62, p  = .013.
20 t(2o) = -4.37, p < .001.
21 Fisher’s exact test, p = .517
22 Twenty-nine female, aged 18–71, M = 26.9, SD = 8.84. One hundred percent reported Eng-
lish as a native language. I excluded data from fifteen participants who failed comprehen-
sion questions.
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4.3.2. Results and discussion
Once again knowledge scores were higher in Harm than in Help.23 The mean 
knowledge score didn’t differ significantly from midpoint in Harm,24 whereas it 
was significantly below the midpoint in Help.25 The modes in Harm were 2 and 4, 
compared to a mode of 1 in Help.
4.4.  Experiment 4
I went even further in the quest to get participants to disagree with the know-
ledge ascription. I presented them with stories that take away not only truth or 
belief, but also justification and, in one case, all three: belief, truth and justifica-
tion. I dispensed with the comparison to a Help condition at this point. Would 
participants finally disagree?
4.4.1. Method
Participants (N = 47)26 were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: True 
and False. Each participant read one of two stories. In each story, the CEO is not 
justified in believing that the program will harm local water quality. The vice-
president says,
We are thinking of starting a new program. It will increase our profits, but 
there is a very, very small chance that it will harm local water quality, since 
it is just possible that it will require us to dump polluted water into the 
river behind our manufacturing plant. Nevertheless, that almost certainly 
won't happen.
The CEO then explicitly rejects the claim that it is even possible that the program 
23 Harm, M = 2.94, SD = 1.21; Help, M = 1.73, SD = 1.28; t(55) = 3.6, MD = 1.21, p < .001.
24 t(34) = -0.279, p = .782, n.s., test value = 3.
25 t(21) = -4.67, p < .001, test value = 3.
26 Twenty-three female, aged 19–65, M = 29, SD = 10.2. Ninety-five percent reported English 
as a native language. I eliminated data from fourteen participants who failed comprehen-
sion questions.
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will harm water quality. Participants in the True condition read a story in which it 
nevertheless turns out that, ‘against all odds,’ the program harms water quality. 
Participants in the False condition read a version in which there ‘was never a real 
chance’ that the program would harm water quality. (The full vignette is included 
in Appendix A.) The comprehension and test questions were the same as in Ex-
periment 2.
4.4.2. Results and discussion
A one-way ANOVA revealed no effect of condition on response to the knowledge 
attribution.27 In neither condition did mean response differ significantly from the 
midpoint.28 The mode in False was 2 (followed closely by 5!), while 2 and 5 were 
both modes in True.
In the story for the False condition in this experiment, the CEO isn’t justified 
in believing the claim in question, he rejects the claim, and the claim is false. But 
participants still were overall neutral on whether this unjustified false non-
belief is knowledge! Perhaps if they were told that the CEO had died last week 
before the proposed program had even been invented, then they would unam-
biguously disagree that he knows. Figure 2 visualizes the results from Experi-
ments 2–4.
27 F(1, 45) = 0.714, p = .403, n.s.
28 True, M = 3.25, SD = 1.54, t(23) = 0.796, p = .434, n.s.; False, M = 2.87, SD = 1.55, t(22) = 
-0.13, p = .690, n.s.; test value = 3.
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Figure 2: Experiments 2–4: Mean agreement with the knowledge ascription, on a 1 (strongly dis-
agree) to 5 (strongly agree) scale. Experiment 2: true non-belief; Experiment 3: false non-belief; Ex-
periment 4: unjustified true/false non-belief. No Help condition was included in Experiments 3 and 
4.
5. Re-evaluating
Experiments 1–3 show that participants are consistently more willing to agree 
that the CEO knows that the environmental side effect will occur when it is harm-
ful rather than helpful. This is true whether the CEO has a normal justified true 
belief, a Gettiered belief, a false belief, no belief, and even when the CEO has no 
belief and the proposition in question is false. What’s more, participant agree-
ment with the knowledge ascription was very high in the case of a false belief. 
Participants in Harm conditions were neutral on whether false non-beliefs were 
knowledge, on whether unjustified true non-beliefs were knowledge, and even on 
whether unjustified false non-beliefs were knowledge.
If we take these results at face value, then there is virtually nothing we can do 
to make participants disagree that the CEO knows that the harmful side effect 
will occur. This poses a serious challenge to the conceptual-competence account 
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of epistemic side-effect effects, for reasons noted at the beginning of section 4. It 
seems unlikely that participants in these studies are competently and literally ap-
plying the concept of knowledge. A more likely explanation is that a seriously 
negative reaction to the CEO is causing performance errors, or that at least many 
participants are agreeing to a statement other than the one explicitly featured in 
the test question, perhaps along the lines of, ‘The CEO is a world-class jerk.’ 29 It 
also seems unlikely that participants are competently and literally applying the 
concept of confidently held belief, since they persist in agreeing that the CEO 
knows even when participants explicitly acknowledge that the CEO rejects the 
claim.
6. The big ESEE: a different approach
I’m interested in trying a different approach to detecting epistemic side-effect ef-
fects. It would be good to detect an effect in such a way that it stands a fighting 
chance of revealing something about our conceptual competence in ascribing 
knowledge, and perhaps, in turn, about knowledge itself. This requires not only 
detecting an effect, but an appropriately circumscribed effect.
For this to work, participants must also be willing deny knowledge in a cer-
tain range of control cases when probed in the same way that produces ESEE. For 
example, they must be willing to deny that false beliefs are knowledge. More 
generally, it would help — though it is not necessarily required — if we detected 
ESEE in an overall pattern of knowledge attribution that broadly agrees with 
mainstream theorizing about knowledge. The agreement doesn’t have to be per-
fect. But if the two are totally at odds, then many epistemologists will suspect that 
the observed effect is not due to conceptual competence but rather to perform-
ance error or more pressing practical concerns, such as blaming the CEO or ex-
29 Compare Alicke and Rose 2010.
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pressing disapproval.
This section reports an experiment designed to detect ESEE within such a 
pattern. The experiment takes a different approach to questioning participants. It  
features a binary knowledge question whose options are ‘really knows’ and ‘only 
thinks he knows’, along with a confidence measure. This basic approach, pion-
eered by Christina Starmans and Ori Friedman (2012), has proven effective in the 
past (see also Turri 2013; but see Cullen 2010 for some cautionary points). It’s 
worth trying here.
6.1. Experiment 5
6.1.1. Method
Participants (N = 228)30 were randomly assigned to one of six conditions (Table 
2) in the same 2 (Valence: Help/Harm) x 3 (Luck: Normal/False/Gettier) 
between-subjects design as in Experiment 1. (See Table 2.) The stories for the 
conditions were again built up from narrative modules. Table 2 shows how the 
stories were built, along with the questions used. The narrative modules were the 
same as in Experiment 1, as were the comprehension questions. But the test 
question was different:
(KQ) When the CEO makes his decision to start the new program, he 
_______ that local water quality will be im-proved/harmed [really 
knows/only thinks he knows].
Participants were then asked to rate how confident they were in their answer to 
the test question, 1 (not at all confident) – 10 (completely confident).
30 Eighty-three female, aged 18–67, M = 27.2, SD = 9.75. Ninety-seven percent reported Eng-
lish as a native language. 
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Table 2: Experiment 5: List of modules composing the storylines, along with the questions.
Normal Harm False Harm Gettier Harm
No Luck
CQ1–4
KQ
No Luck
Bad Luck
CQ1–2, 4
KQ
No Luck
Bad Luck
Good Luck
CQ1–4
KQ
Normal Help False Help Gettier Help
No Luck
CQ1–4
KQ
No Luck
Bad Luck
CQ1–2, 4
KQ
No Luck
Bad Luck
Good Luck
CQ1–4
KQ
As before, the Normal stories are very similar to the original CEO cases. The 
False stories introduce a twist: it turns out that the environmental side effect 
doesn’t occur. The Gettier stories introduce two twists: the new program doesn’t 
produce the environmental side effect, but the something else does, which the 
CEO is unaware of.
6.1.2. Results and discussion
Following Starmans and Friedman (2012), I define a weighted knowledge 
ascription as the product of the answer to the dichotomous knowledge question 
(really knows = 1; only thinks he knows = -1) and the reported confidence (1–10).  
Scores for this measure thus fall on a twenty-point scale, ranging from -10 (fully 
confident knowledge denial) to 10 (fully confident knowledge ascription).
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) detected a main effect of Valence,31 
a main effect of Luck,32 and an interaction of Valence and Luck33 on weighted 
knowledge ascription. 
Pairwise comparisons with independent-samples t-tests revealed that mean 
31 F(2, 222) = 37.26, p < .001, ηp2 = .251.
32 F(1, 222) = 10.54, p = .001, ηp2 = .045.
33 F(2, 222) = 4.90, p = .008, ηp2 = .042.
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weighted knowledge ascription was higher in Normal Harm than in Normal 
Help,34  higher in False Harm than in False Help,35 but no different between Get-
tier Harm and Gettier Help.36 Mean weighted knowledge ascription was signific-
antly above the midpoint in Normal Harm,37 no different from midpoint in Nor-
mal Help,38 and significantly below the midpoint in both False conditions and 
both Gettier conditions.39
Looking at the dichotomous knowledge question reveals a similar picture. 
The rate of knowledge attribution was higher in Normal Harm than in Normal 
Help,40 and it was higher in False Harm than in False Help,41 but it didn’t differ 
between Gettier Harm and Gettier Help.42 Rate of knowledge attribution was 
above what could be expected by chance in Normal Harm,43 no different from 
chance in Normal Help,44 and significantly below chance in all the other condi-
tions.45
Figure 3 visualizes the results from this experiment.
34 Normal Harm, M = 6.34, SD = 6.8; Normal Help, M = 0.03, SD = 3.82; t(63.17) = 3.45, 
MD = 6.31, p = 0.001.
35 False Harm, M = -2.68, SD = 8.64; False Help, M = -6.34, SD = 5.81; t(68.65) = 2.18, MD 
= 3.67, p = .033.
36 Gettier Harm, M = -6.67, SD = 6.04; Gettier Help, M = -5.88, SD = 6.35; t(79) = -0.57, p 
= .571, n.s.
37 t(37) = 5.733, p < .001, test value = 0.
38 t(33) = 0.02, p = .984, n.s., test value = 0.
39 One-sample t-tests, all ps ≤ .057, test value = 0.
40 Harm: 84%, Help: 50%, Fisher’s exact test, p = .002.
41 Harm: 33%, Help: 11%, Fisher’s exact test, p = .051.
42 Harm: 15%, Help: 14%, Fisher’s exact test, p = 1.
43 Binomial test, p < .001.
44 Binomial test, p  = 1.
45 Binomial tests, ps ≤ .038.
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Figure 3: Experiment 5: Top panel: percentage of participants ascribing knowledge in response to 
the dichotomous question. Botom panel: Mean weighted knowledge ascriptions.
These results provide evidence of an appropriately constrained epistemic 
side-effect effect. Overall, only one condition produced results that are arguably 
inconsistent with a mainstream, nonskeptical theory of knowledge: Normal Help. 
It is surprising that participants in this condition were ambivalent about whether 
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the CEO really knows that local water quality will be improved. After all, stopping 
pollution from being dumped into the water is an extremely reliable way of im-
proving water quality. It’s possible that random variation resulted in an unusually 
skeptical lot being assigned to this condition. But even if we suppose that the 
population mean for weighted knowledge ascription in Normal Help would be 
significantly above the midpoint at, say, 4, that would still be significantly below 
what was observed in Normal Harm.46 So, ultimately, I don’t think that the unex-
pectedly low number in Normal Help should make us especially suspicious of the 
overall result.
The results from False Harm are also a bit surprising, with 33% saying that 
the CEO really knows something that is false. Previous studies have shown that 
roughly 10–15% of participants are typically willing to ascribe false knowledge 
when the belief is justified (Starmans and Friedman 2012, Buckwalter ms, Turri 
2013), but the percentage observed here is significantly greater than even 15%.47 
By contrast, the percentage ascribing false knowledge in False Help is very sim-
ilar to what has been observed previously in the literature.
Despite these two unexpected observations, there are no intolerable “red 
flags” in these results that should definitely make us reject the suggestion that 
participants are competently and literally applying their concept of knowledge. 
The overall results are mainly consistent with what mainstream theorists of 
knowledge would predict (again, the one exception being Normal Help). Yet we 
still observe a significant effect of side-effect valence. A constrained effect of this 
sort is arguably eligible to inform substantive theorizing about knowledge or our 
concept thereof.
46 t(37) = 2.12, p = .041, one-tailed, test value = 4.
47 Binomial test, p = .004, one-tailed, test proportion = .15.
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7. Conclusion
By this point, it is definitely beyond reasonable doubt that the side-effect effect 
extends to knowledge ascriptions. ESEE is real and interesting in its own right. 
But what can it teach us? Ideally it would teach something about our concept of  
knowledge, and ultimately about knowledge itself. In order for it to teach us 
either of those things, the effect must manifest itself in a way that is plausibly due 
to a competent and literal application of our concept of knowledge. And in order 
to do that, it must be appropriately constrained. Up until now, that hasn’t ap-
peared to be the case (Experiments 1–4). But Experiment 5 provides evidence of 
an appropriately constrained effect.
My focus has been whether ESEE is appropriately constrained. But an 
equally important question for future research is whether it is appropriately un-
constrained. At least three challenges lie ahead in this direction. I will briefly de-
scribe them here.
First, if our concept of knowledge, or knowledge itself, really is sensitive to 
evaluative facts, then this sensitivity probably won’t be limited to side-effect pro-
positions. A side-effect proposition is a proposition about a course of action’s side 
effects. For example, in the CEO case above, the side-effect proposition is that 
local water quality will be harmed or helped. A central-effect proposition is a pro-
position about the primary effects that an action is intended to achieve. In the 
CEO case, the central-effect proposition is that the new program will increase 
company profits. It’s hard to believe that our conceptual competence in ascribing 
knowledge would be sensitive to the moral valence of side effects but not to the 
moral valence of central effects. Similarly, if knowledge itself does depend on 
non-epistemically evaluative facts in surprising ways, it seems unlikely that this 
would be restricted to knowledge of side effects. Indeed, knowledge of many sorts 
of propositions, not necessarily connected to the consequences of the agent’s ac-
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tions, will probably likewise depend evaluative facts.
Second, if our concept of knowledge, or knowledge itself, really is sensitive to 
evaluative facts, then this sensitivity probably won’t be limited to knowledge 
based on testimony, or “second-hand knowledge.” We should expect to see the ef-
fect in cases of “first-hand knowledge” too, such as beliefs based on perception, 
introspection, inference or memory. Perhaps this second challenge could be res-
isted on the grounds that different doxastic sources have very different profiles in 
folk epistemology,48 in which case other factors might prevent a similar pattern 
for other sources.
Third, if our concept of knowledge, or knowledge itself, really is sensitive to 
evaluative facts, then this sensitivity won’t be limited to a specific genre of cases. 
For example, it won’t be limited to CEO cases. We should observe an appropri-
ately constrained effect when using a wide range of cover stories. Prior work on 
ESEE has observed it using multiple cover stories, so I expect that this challenge 
will be met.
Those are three further tests for understanding ESEE’s theoretical signific-
ance. If we don’t observe an appropriately unconstrained effect, then ESEE might 
not manifest conceptual competence. By contrast, if we do observe a similar effect 
for central-effect propositions and first-hand knowledge and a wide range of 
cover stories, then three things follow. First, the effect will need a new name, 
since it would have nothing special to do with side effects. (Perhaps the evaluat-
ive effect will suffice.) Second, and more importantly, a conceptual-competence 
explanation of the effect becomes much more attractive. Third, consequently, 
substantive theorizing about the nature of knowledge will arguably have to take 
the effect into account.
Suppose those challenges are met and we’re convinced that ESEE reveals 
something important about knowledge and our concept thereof. Then we’ll face 
48 See Friedman and Turri, under review; Turri, under review a; and Turri, under review b.
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an important set of further questions, including why knowledge is sensitive to 
these evaluative considerations, how this sensitivity is reflected in the psychology 
of knowledge attributions, and whether, upon reflection, our concept knowledge 
should be sensitive to such considerations. Why would knowledge work this way? 
How is that sensitivity reflected in the way people think about and ascribe know-
ledge? And once we are made aware that our ordinary practice of ascribing know-
ledge is sensitive in this way, is this something we should endorse, or should we 
instead change our concept so that it isn’t thus sensitive, or adopt a related 
concept that lacks such sensitivity? Some important progress has already been 
made along these lines by experimental philosophers and naturalists in epistemo-
logy (e.g. Schaffer 2008, Knobe 2010, Schaffer and Knobe 2012, Craig 1990, 
Kornblith 2002, Hawthorne 2004). But this research program would benefit tre-
mendously from greater involvement from other areas of cognitive science be-
sides epistemology and experimental philosophy, including cognitive anthropo-
logy, cognitive ethology, and cognitive, evolutionary and developmental psycho-
logy.49
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Appendix A: materials for Experiment 4
The vignette:
The vice president of a manufacturing company went to the CEO and said, 
"We are thinking of starting a new program. It will increase our profits, 
but there is a very, very small chance that it will harm local water qual-
ity, since it is just possible that it will require us to dump polluted water 
into the river behind our manufacturing plant. Nevertheless, that almost  
certainly won't happen." The CEO answered, "I agree that this plan will 
make us lots of profit. But I reject your claim that it is even possible that it 
will harm local water quality. Anyway, I don't care at all about harming 
local water quality. I just want to make as much profit as I can." Then the 
CEO made his decision: "Let's start the new program and make some seri-
ous profits." ¶ The company then started the new program, and sure 
enough, over the next few months, they made lots of profits. But the vice-
president was wrong about something: there was never a real chance that 
it would harm local water quality [But, against all odds, the program did 
harm local water quality].
